LAGUNJU v. OLUBADAN-IN COUNCIL (PC – Lord Normand, pp406-411.)

MEMUDU LAGUNJU

V.

OLUBADAN-IN-COUNCIL & ANOTHER

THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL

5TH DAY OF MAY, 1952

2PLR/1952/22 (P.C.)

OTHER CITATION(S)

2PLR/1952/22 (P.C.)

(1952) P.C. 05/05-1952

(1952) XII WACA PP. 406 – 411

LEX (1952) – XII WACA 406 – 411

BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:

LORD NORMAND,

LORD RADCLIFFE AND LORD ASQUITB OF BISHOPSTONE

BETWEEN:

MEMUDU LAGUNJU – Appellant

AND

OLUBADAN-IN-COUNCIL & ANOTHER – Respondents

ORIGINATING COURT(S)

Appeal from the West African Court of Appeal.

ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION

(Nigeria) — Chief — Appointment — Whether in accordance with native law and custom — Governor of the sole Judge — Jurisdiction of Courts excluded — “Due inquiry” — Duties of Governor — Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance, section 2(1) & (2).

CASE SUMMARY

By sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance of Nigeria: “In the case of any dispute the Governor, after due inquiry and consultation with the persons concerned in the selection, shall be the sole Judge as to whether any appointment of a Chief has been made in accordance with native law and custom.”

The above sub-section commits to the Governor exclusively the duty of judging whether an appointment has been made in accordance with native law and custom, and the jurisdiction of the Courts to decide that question is absolutely and unconditionally excluded by the sub-section.

The requirement that· there shall be due inquiry and consultation with the persons concerned in the selection is not a condition precedent to the Governor’s jurisdiction as sole Judge or to the exclusion of the Court’s jurisdiction, but it is a condition of the Governor’s valid exercise of his function of sole Judge. If he comes to a decision without having made due inquiry or consultation then in an appropriate action it would be competent for the Courts to set his decision aside. In no circumstances, however, could the Courts assume to themselves jurisdiction to decide that an appointment had or had not been made in accordance with native law and custom, and accordingly, when an action was so framed as to submit that question to the Court’s decision the action was incompetent. “Due inquiry” was not necessarily public inquiry, but it implied that the parties to the dispute should be given an opportunity of being heard by the Governor as Judge between them, and in intimating a decision under section 2(2) the Governor should unambiguously declare that the appointment had (or had not) been made in accordance with native law and custom.